R.I.P. Sangoma Being Acquired

My question:
Is FreePBX and Asterisk licensed in such a way as close-sourcing them would be impossible?
EDIT: This was the whole idea of GPL, when you make a useful change, you MUST contribute it to upstream.
Let me pose a different tack: setting AI aside, given how mature PBX systems are, is there really any need for "feature upgrades" for many users? If there is a future change in phone tech -- whether in terms of cutting-edge devices, or even the network, sure; your PBX needs to adapt to that. But otherwise a call is a call, a hold is a hold, a forward is a forward, a park is a park, etc. Maybe the latest and greatest open source Asterisk and FreePBX are forked, and all that is done going forward are bug fixes and security fixes...
 
Let me pose a different tack: setting AI aside, given how mature PBX systems are, is there really any need for "feature upgrades" for many users?
Probably not, but the elephant in the room would be the operating system.
 
So... I join @kenn10 in suggesting you begin taking a careful look at FS PBX and FusionPBX. Except for our honeypots, we've been running these platforms for more than a year now with zero problems.

For a small home user (two trunks, three endpoints) which makes more sense from an ease of use standpoint for initial setup and ongoing maintenance?
 
For a small home user (two trunks, three endpoints) which makes more sense from an ease of use standpoint for initial setup and ongoing maintenance?
Using Voip.ms instead of a PBX. If you are used to a product, it will always be easier to stay with it than moving to another product. At least it will until what you use becomes unsupported, lacks security fixes, and is discontinued; at which point you are in panic mode to move to something else.
 
Using Voip.ms instead of a PBX. If you are used to a product, it will always be easier to stay with it than moving to another product. At least it will until what you use becomes unsupported, lacks security fixes, and is discontinued; at which point you are in panic mode to move to something else.
Problem #1 is that the entire VoIP.ms platform is reportedly built on Asterisk.
 
Using Voip.ms instead of a PBX.

This. :) Or similar.

Actually, for personal use, once I got an Obi200 long ago, I slowly stopped using my home hardware-based IPBX. Even though now deprecated, the Obi does everything I need even for reasonably geeky home telephony.

For non-home use -- small biz and other stuff -- I still use IPBX, in a cloud instance (for a number of years it has been RackNerd with zero problems).

But maybe it is time for me to start more seriously looking at FS...
 
The good news is that those using Incredible PBX don't have to rely upon the FreePBX repos for updates. Whether there will be additional updates, of course, is anybody's guess at this juncture.
 
Guess what happens to non-profit generating parts of the company like FreePBX.
I'm curious as to how this conclusion was drawn and why everyone is running with a speculative theory? I didn't realize that killing off a completely 100% commercial revenue stream (i.e. PBXact) plus other revenue streams was the plan. Multiple commercial revenue streams rely on FreePBX and Asterisk. I mean it is a good way to make the entire reseller agent ecosystem get mad and cause churn at that level.

Who knows, maybe you're all right and BRC will just say F it and cut 15M-20M+ of annual revenue. Not like they need SIPStation or FAXStation since those user bases are almost completely FreePBX users.
 
I'm curious as to how this conclusion was drawn and why everyone is running with a speculative theory? I didn't realize that killing off a completely 100% commercial revenue stream (i.e. PBXact) plus other revenue streams was the plan. Multiple commercial revenue streams rely on FreePBX and Asterisk. I mean it is a good way to make the entire reseller agent ecosystem get mad and cause churn at that level.

Who knows, maybe you're all right and BRC will just say F it and cut 15M-20M+ of annual revenue. Not like they need SIPStation or FAXStation since those user bases are almost completely FreePBX users.
Well, Compaq took over DEC mainly for their global service organization then ended up dumping off the computer and semiconductor manufacturing operations. So yeah, why would any company dump off revenue generating operations?
 
Well, Compaq took over DEC mainly for their global service organization then ended up dumping off the computer and semiconductor manufacturing operations. So yeah, why would any company dump off revenue generating operations?
No, they shut down the *failing* PC and Notebook line and kept everything else including the semiconductor part. You left out the part that Compaq was dying, this was a last ditch effort to compete with IBM and four years later was bought by HP and then the semiconductor part was killed. This also wasn't a case of a holding company buying something. So it's an apples and oranges comparison.

It also wasn't what I was asking. I quoted the statement where I asked how the conclusion was made. Which was that the FreePBX revenue was non-profit revenue. How is that known? Where did the data for this come from?
 
I was a c-band manager at Avaya. I started with AT&T, spun off as Lucent Technologies, and spun again as Avaya.
Interesting insight.
As an aside, I worked for Lucent Technologies in Oz. In 2000 I took a six week trip (on leave) to the US for a convention. When I returned there was new signage in the foyer of the building. I thought another company had taken space in the building but returning to my desk I found that I was now working for Avaya.
 
I found that I was now working for Avaya.
At my end, we all knew it had happened as it was announced on an all hands conference call. I guess being on leave, you missed all the fanfare and emails. The big change was that the company moved to a performance based structure for management. The years of AT&T and Lucent giving useless people "positions" in the interest of diversity ended and everyone had to actually work. Many fled the company or were terminated after inadequate performance, so all of that was good. We all thought that the page had turned and things would look up but the heavy load of craft contracts, retirement expense, and dwindling sales after Y2K took its toll when the company went private and the board of directors sold their souls to the holding companies.
 
No, they shut down the *failing* PC and Notebook line and kept everything else including the semiconductor part. You left out the part that Compaq was dying, this was a last ditch effort to compete with IBM and four years later was bought by HP and then the semiconductor part was killed. This also wasn't a case of a holding company buying something. So it's an apples and oranges comparison.

It also wasn't what I was asking. I quoted the statement where I asked how the conclusion was made. Which was that the FreePBX revenue was non-profit revenue. How is that known? Where did the data for this come from?

And so is Sangoma failing


Net loss of $72.5 million ($2.19 loss per share fully diluted) compared to a Net income of $0.2 million

Net Loss for the full year of fiscal 2026 was $81.1 million
 
Last edited:
Net Loss for the full year of fiscal 2026 was $81.1 million

Yeah looks bad by themselves without any context. Again, Sangoma ain't doing great and is struggling but hard failing is a bit far reached.

First, there is a cash impairment of $68.4M. Basically, it's saying the acquisitions they made years ago are not worth what they once where and impairments are non-cash charges that usually end up in Q4 reports. It does not reflect the performance of Q4.

Second, there is the $3M write-down. Same basic story expect it impacts profit margins. Sangoma is sitting on hardware (appliances, gateways, phones) in their stock that they bought but haven't sold. It generally means the inventory stock has lost value or is selling below costs. So "We had $50M in inventory stock that is now worth $47M" which means another line item. These types of things end up in Q4 again.

These two things are basically non-cash charges. The charges are accounting recognition, not Q4 or 2026 operations.

Also, once again...no one has answered how the revenue from FreePBX is non-profit revenue. I keep getting other answers that are summaries and not break downs.

I guess it's not going to be answered since no one has the answer. Just wild speculation.
 
Yeah looks bad by themselves without any context. Again, Sangoma ain't doing great and is struggling but hard failing is a bit far reached.

First, there is a cash impairment of $68.4M. Basically, it's saying the acquisitions they made years ago are not worth what they once where and impairments are non-cash charges that usually end up in Q4 reports. It does not reflect the performance of Q4.

Second, there is the $3M write-down. Same basic story expect it impacts profit margins. Sangoma is sitting on hardware (appliances, gateways, phones) in their stock that they bought but haven't sold. It generally means the inventory stock has lost value or is selling below costs. So "We had $50M in inventory stock that is now worth $47M" which means another line item. These types of things end up in Q4 again.

These two things are basically non-cash charges. The charges are accounting recognition, not Q4 or 2026 operations.

Also, once again...no one has answered how the revenue from FreePBX is non-profit revenue. I keep getting other answers that are summaries and not break downs.

I guess it's not going to be answered since no one has the answer. Just wild speculation.
I don't recall anyone suggesting that "revenue from FreePBX is non-profit revenue." I think the point was that there is insufficient profit from the FreePBX platform to continue moving it forward. Security patches, maybe. New features, never.
 
I don't recall anyone suggesting that "revenue from FreePBX is non-profit revenue."
Then what is this:
Guess what happens to non-profit generating parts of the company like FreePBX.

I think the point was that there is insufficient profit from the FreePBX platform
That's not what was said. It was stated it's non-profit generating part. You have no idea what kind of profit is made from the FreePBX platform since it's the base for a lot of commercial revenue and it's not broken out in revenue reports. However, without FreePBX those commercial revenue streams no longer exist.

Since none of the revenue streams are broken down beyond Services and Products, everyone is vibe financing what those totals actually are and what they feel it belongs to.

Really at this point, you guys can keep vibing this. I'll wait for actual things to happen.
 
"That's not what was said. It was stated it's non-profit generating part." - @Samot

I disagree.

Open-source only FreePBX is not revenue producing. There are doubtless hundreds of thousands of free FreePBX deployments out there (including IncrediblePBX and TangoPBX.) FreePBX makes revenue with adjunct commercial modules, support contracts, hardware, PBXact, etc. People are already creating open source, free modules to replace some commercial modules FreePBX sells. As to Asterisk, there are other products based on it but I don't see a different profit model for it either; other than hardware they sell with it. With other larger revenue producing products, companies often retire or abruptly shut down the less profitable.

We'll all have to to wait and see.
 
Here is some analysis by Grok of what happens to companies that are sold to holding companies or outright bought out:

**Layoffs and product discontinuations after sales to holding companies (or similar buyers like private equity firms) are common but highly variable—often modest in net employment terms overall, more pronounced in certain deal types, and frequent for products especially in tech.** There is no single universal rate, as outcomes depend on the buyer’s strategy (cost-cutting vs. growth), deal type (e.g., public-to-private vs. private-to-private), industry, redundancies, and performance of the target. “Holding companies” often operate similarly to private equity (PE) or conglomerates that seek efficiencies, synergies, or portfolio optimization.

### Layoffs / Employment Effects
Empirical studies (especially on PE buyouts, a common form of acquisition by financial holding-style entities) show:

- **Modest net job losses overall in many cases**: Classic research tracking thousands of PE targets finds employment at target establishments declines roughly 3% over two years and 6% over five years relative to controls. Net relative job losses (after accounting for new job creation at new sites, acquisitions, and divestitures) are often under 1% of initial employment. Gross job creation *and* destruction is higher (about 13% excess over controls), reflecting “creative destruction”—more turnover, plant closures of less productive units, and reallocation.

- **Larger effects in specific deal types**:
- Public-to-private buyouts: Employment falls ~12–13% relative to controls over two years.
- Divisional carve-outs: Declines around 16%.
- Private company or secondary buyouts: Often employment *rises* (~10–15%).
- Overall average across PE: Net relative losses around 4–4.4% in some updated analyses.

- **Attrition and targeted cuts are frequent**: Employees at acquired firms show elevated attrition (voluntary + involuntary). One analysis found ~18% of acquired-company employees no longer at the parent 18 months later. Recruiting, marketing, entry-level, and executive roles are hit hardest; support functions (finance, HR, admin) often face redundancy cuts shortly after close. Senior management attrition can approach 20%. In tech/SaaS, pure “integration layoffs” have become less automatic than in past decades, but reviews still occur at close, ~1 year, and ~2 years.

- **Timing and triggers**: Redundant overlapping roles (especially corporate functions) are often cut in the first months. Broader restructuring can unfold over 1–2+ years as integration proceeds or performance is assessed. Some high-profile PE/holding-style deals (e.g., 3G Capital’s approach with Heinz/Kraft) involve aggressive multi-wave cuts of hundreds to thousands of jobs for cost synergies. Post-M&A integration continues to drive thousands of announced reductions annually in recent data.

- **Not inevitable or uniform**: Many deals preserve or grow headcount if the goal is expansion rather than pure cost-cutting. Productivity often rises. Worker-level studies sometimes show small net employment probability drops (~2% less likely employed after three years in one large analysis) but larger earnings hits for those who leave. Bankruptcy risk can be elevated in highly leveraged deals, leading to larger eventual losses in those cases.

In short, some level of restructuring/layoff activity is typical when roles overlap or the buyer prioritizes efficiency, but wholesale mass layoffs are not automatic in every sale to a holding company.

### Product Discontinuation
This is often more common than major net layoffs, particularly in technology and software:

- In Big Tech (GAFAM) acquisitions of startups/products (2015–2021 data and related studies): A large share of acquired products are discontinued. One analysis of the five largest platforms found ~60% discontinued; Google Play apps acquired by GAFAM saw roughly half discontinued; other software studies report 45–57%+ no longer available under the original brand (higher, up to ~80%, when acquired by major platforms). Categories include full discontinuation/kill, integration into the acquirer’s ecosystem (losing independent identity), or simple non-continuation.

- Broader M&A evidence: Merging firms can see the number of products sold decline 30–40% over four years relative to non-merging peers (affecting both target and acquirer products). Distance from the combined firm’s core portfolio predicts higher removal rates. In consumer packaged goods, new product failure is already high (~25% gone after one year, ~40% after two), and acquisitions can accelerate portfolio rationalization.

Holding companies or PE buyers may discontinue underperforming lines, non-core products, or those that do not fit the broader portfolio strategy to focus resources and extract value. In conglomerate-style holding structures, subsidiaries are sometimes run more independently, reducing immediate product kills compared to full strategic integrations—but portfolio reviews still lead to exits.

### Key Caveats and Drivers
- **Buyer type and strategy matter most**: Aggressive cost-focused PE/holding models (high leverage, zero-based budgeting) produce more cuts. Growth-oriented or longer-hold approaches may invest and expand. Pure financial holding companies sometimes leave operations relatively untouched.
- **Industry variation**: Retail and services often see sharper declines in certain studies; tech sees high product kill rates but variable employment outcomes. Cross-industry deals can show better subsequent employee growth.
- **Context**: Redundancies drive early cuts. Later changes depend on performance. WARN Act (or state equivalents) applies to large U.S. mass layoffs, requiring notice.
- **Data limits**: Most rigorous stats focus on PE or large M&A rather than every “holding company” sale. Outcomes are relative to matched non-acquired firms and vary by era and market conditions.

Overall, **expect some restructuring** (role consolidations and selective product pruning) as a normal part of many such transactions, with measurable but often moderate net employment effects and higher product discontinuation rates in digital/tech settings. Extreme slash-and-burn outcomes occur but are not the universal rule across all deals. Individual results hinge on the specific buyer, deal rationale, and target’s situation.
 

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